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INTRODUCTION

"Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the
homeless, tempest tossed to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden door."
Those are the words of Emma Lazarus, inscribed on the Statute of Liberty.
Unfortunately, the United States has continually interpreted those words to
mean men, not women, particularly, women seeking asylum. Women
make up a majority of the world's refugees,' yet their particular needs
*
B.A., 1975, University of Maine; M.Ed., 1979, Boston University; Candidate for Juris
Doctor, 1997, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author wishes to
express appreciation to attorney Clark Trainer for introducing her to the subject of this article and
to Immigration Judge Neale Foster for his support and encouragement.
1. Third Circuit Recognizes PotentialAsylum Claim Based on Gender, 71 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 164 (Jan. 24, 1994); see also Nancy Kelly, Gender-RelatedPersecution: Assessing the
Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 625-26 n.1 (1993).
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have been overlooked. 2
While the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) recently
issued new procedural guidelines, recognizing rape and other sexual
persecution as a potential justification for asylum claims,3 they are
intended to educate asylum officers and immigration judges on the
procedural aspects of women's asylum claims and do not acknowledge
gender-based persecution alone as a basis for asylum.' A woman must still
establish she is persecuted because of her political opinion in order to
justify relief.'
Gender-based persecution is violence directed at women
specifically because they are women.6 A woman may be persecuted
because of her gender' or a trait related to her gender.' Such abuse
includes: dowry related murders9 and bride burnings l in India; rape; 1
forced sterilization in China 12 and Mexico;"3 genital mutilation in the

2.

Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution Claims, IMMIGR.

BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1994, No. 94-9, at 1.

3. See Ashley Dunn, Abused Women Can Win PoliticalAsylum, MIAMI HERALD, May
28, 1995, at 9A (noting that the decision to adopt the guidelines was a result of the mass rape of
women in Bosnia).
4. Id.
5. Id. A refugee may also establish persecution for asylum purposes on account of her
race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (1988).
6. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against
Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 195 (1993) (according to India's statistics there were over
eleven-thousand dowry murders between 1990 and 1993).
10. Peter C. Godfrey, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: the Expansion of
the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 257, (1994) (citing to
Jill Lawrence, Gender PersecutionNew Reasonfor Asylum, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at 14).

11. Rape by the military, or for military purposes, is a worldwide problem. It is used to
punish actual or imputed opposing political views of the victim or her family, as well as to
control local populations. It becomes persecution when the government either condones or fails
to protect against such abuse. See M. Jane Kronenberger, Refugee Women: Establishing a
Prima Facie Case Under the Refugee Convention, 15 ILSA J. INT'L L. 61, 66 (1992); see also
Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecutionon the Basis of Membership
in a ParticularSocial Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 173, 173 (1993).

12.

Nurjehan Mawani, Introduction to the Immigration and Refugee Board Guidelines on

Gender-RelatedPersecution, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 240, 246 (1993).

13. "Of all Mexican women using birth control today, 45 percent are sterilized, up from 9
percent two decades ago." Nancie L. Katz, Mexican Women Describe Coerced Sterilization at
Government Clinics, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 1995, at 8A. The results of a 1987 national
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Middle East, Africa,14 and Asia; 5 and domestic abuse. 6 Gender-based
persecution can also take the form of repressive and discriminatory laws
and practices meant to oppress and subordinate women. In Haiti, adultery
results in a potential three month prison sentence for women while men are
fined $6.50.11 In Islamic countries, women are required to veil their faces
or face flogging and imprisonment by the religious police.' 8 In Muslim
countries, women living alone face abuse for failing to have a male family
member's protection.' 9 Each of these acts constitutes gender-based
violence directed specifically at women. Such abuse rises to the level of
persecution when the government is either unable, or unwilling, to prevent
20
it.
The United States must recognize gender-based violence and
should expand the definition of the "particular social group" classification
for asylum claims to meet the needs of women facing such persecution.
Courts must recognize the types of violence targeted specifically at women
as well as a state's involvement in such action, and follow the decisions in

health survey showed that one out of twenty-five women who are sterilized did not agree to it.
Id.
14. "An estimated seventy percent to ninety percent of Egyptians are circumcised just
before puberty." Egypt Bans Circumcision of Females at State Hospitals, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
30, 1995, at 13A.
15. Mattie L. Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add
Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179, 193 (1993).
Female genital mutilation includes clitoridotomy, clitoridectomy and
infibulation. Clitoridectomy is the removal of the prepuce of the clitoris.
Clitorectomy removes the clitoris and the surrounding tissue.
An
infibulation involves the excision of the clitoris, labia minora and most of the
labia majora, followed by the sewing of the sides of the vulva, "leaving a
hole the size of a match stick."
Id.
16. Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 115 (1993). In
Brazil alone, over 400 women were murdered by their spouses or lovers between 1987 and 1989
in the state of Penambuco. The criminal justice system of Brazil recognizes a "defense of honor"
and, during the same period above, seventy percent of all reported acts of violence were in
private residences and most were committed by husbands or lovers. Id.
17. Haiti's Victimized Women, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 1995, at 8A (a man can also
claim extenuating circumstances for murdering his adulterous wife).
18. Stevens, supra note 15, at 195.
19. Nancy Kelly, Guidelinesfor Women's Asylum Claims, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 517,
528 n.40 (1994).
20. The United States requires state participation in the persecution either through action or
inaction in order for an alien to qualify for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1982).
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In re A and Z,2 and In re M.K.Y Part I reviews the historical background
of refugee and asylum law. Part II discusses the history of United States
asylum law and how it has been applied to female refugees. Part III looks
at recommendations by the United Nations and changes being implemented
in Canada and Germany to meet the needs of women seeking asylum under
claims of gender-based persecution. Part IV examines the first known
cases in the United States where an Immigration Judge granted asylum to
two women, one claiming domestic abuse, and another claiming both
domestic abuse and abuse as a result of female genital mutilation, finding
both members of a "particular social group."
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAWS

Asylum is the discretionary grant of haven to an individual who
meets the definition of a refugee. The definition of refugee originated in
1946 by the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
created for the protection and resettlement of displaced victims of World
War II.'
The definition of refugee was developed further by the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees24 which added "particular
social group" as a category' and was refined by the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.26
The Convention and the Protocol are
independent provisions; the United States ratified the Protocol in
November 1968, but never signed the Convention." Parties to either the
Convention, the Protocol, or both comply with their obligations under
21. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington, .Va.
Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision).
22. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington, Va. Apr. 13, 1995)
(unpublished I.J. decision).
23. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 63 n. 10 (citing the Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug.
20, 1948)).
24. David Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as
Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 203, 226 n.128 (1988) (citing the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951, art. 1A(2) 19
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Convention]).
25. Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing
Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565, 590 (1993). The Swedish delegation added
.particular social group" to the grounds for asylum, recognizing the potential failure of the other
four categories to include "all the reasons for persecution an imaginative despot could conjure
up." d. at 590 n. 143.
26. Neal, supra note 24, at 227 n.128 (citing the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (effective Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]).
27. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 64 n.20.
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these instruments by creating domestic refugee laws and policies.2
Convention defines a refugee as any person who
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[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling

to return to

it.

29

The Protocol adopted the Convention definition of refugee but removed the
geographic and temporal restrictions and added victims of inhumane
treatment world-wide.30
This has become the dominant definition of refugee world-wide,
with numerous countries implementing the same or a similar definition.
France became a party to the Convention in 1952 and enacted the Office of
Francais des Protection des Refugees et Apatrides, using the same
definition. 3 ' The 1971 Immigration Act of Great Britain refers to the
Convention definition, 2 while the 1982 Asylum Procedure Law of
Germany states refugees will at a minimum enjoy the status recognized by
the Convention.3 3 The Convention definition of refugee is applied by
Canada, Switzerland, the Organization of African Unity, with similar
definitions implemented by the 1954 Caracas Convention on Territorial
35
Asylum 34 and the United States.

28.

Id.

29. Neal, supra note 24, at 228 n.131.
30. Bower, supra note 11, at 177.
31. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 65 n.24 (citing the Office of Francais des Protection
des Refugees et patrides, Loi. No. 52-893 of July 25, 1952, art. 2.).
32. Id. at 65.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
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1980 ESTABLISHED THE CURRENT36 LAWS FOR

ADMITTING REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES.

The United States asylum law is modeled after and governed by
the Convention and the Protocol.3 7 It follows the United Nations
Handbook38 as a persuasive guide when determining refugee status. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), first enacted in 1952, did not
mention the word refugee.39 In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act was passed
by Congress to deal with World War II refugees,' but the Act did not
include refugees until 1957."' It was not until 1965 that Congress, by
amending the Act, made refugee a distinct category for admission into the
United States, ending the selection of immigrants, mainly Europeans,
based on national origin, race, or ancestry.42 Section 3 of the 1965 Act
stated in part that refugees include those who have fled from any
Communist or Communist-dominated country, or area, or from any
country within the general area of the Middle East, and are unable or
unwilling to return to such country because of persecution or fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.43
The Refugee Act of 1980 established the current laws for admitting
refugees into the United States." Under the Act, asylum is granted to
those who meet the definition of refugee as stated in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (1982). A refugee is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality, or in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

36. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).

§ 201, § 101(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102-03

37.

Bower, supra note 11, at 176.

38.

Kelly, supra note 19, at 521 n.15 (citing UNHCR's Handbook for Determining

Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
(Geneva 1979)).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101.
40. Stevens, supra note 15, at 181.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 181-82 (citing Act of Oct. 3, 1965,

§§

3, 203(1)(7)).

43. Id. at 181-82.
44.

Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 102-03 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

§

1101(a)(42) (1988).
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.45
An individual may seek asylum either at designated locations
outside of the United States,' or at any time after arrival into the United
States by presenting her claim to the INS for review by an asylum
officer.47 If the claim is denied, the INS begins either exclusion or
deportation proceedings s against the individual. The alien may then file a
new application for asylum with an immigration judge as a form of relief
from either exclusion or deportation.49
While persecution has no universally accepted definition,5" the
Handbook and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Basic Law
Manual (Manual) considers serious physical harm, loss of freedom, threat
to life, discriminatory treatment which leads to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature, 5' and a combination of numerous harms,
which standing alone may not constitute persecution, but in combination
create a well-founded fear of persecution, as forms of persecution. 52 The
Manual also recognizes arbitrary interference with a person's privacy,
family, home, or correspondence as forms of persecution. Furthermore,
the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has characterized persecution as
harm or suffering inflicted upon a person to punish that individual for a

45.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).

46. An individual seeking asylum outside the United States is known as an "asylee," while
a person who applies for asylum either upon entry into, or once in, the United States is referred
to as a "refugee."
47.

8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b) (1988).

48. An individual who is not accepted during inspection upon entry into the United States
faces exclusion proceedings and is known as an applicant, while an alien either admitted or
paroled into the United States is placed into deportation proceedings and is referred to as a
respondent.
49. Administrative immigration judges, sitting in different regions of the country, are
under the supervision of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). EOIR and the
INS are part of the Department of Justice but are independent of one another. Decisions of the
immigration judge are appealable to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) whose members
are appointed by the Attorney General. Once all administrative remedies are exhausted, an alien
may file for review with the Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the deportation hearing was
heard. Appeals to the United States Supreme Court are possible, but rare.
50. Persecution was not defined by the Convention or the Protocol.
51. Discriminatory treatment such as the denial of the right to earn a living, practice one's
religion, or have access to educational facilities are considered forms of persecution. See Kelly,
supra note 19, at 521.
52. Certain human rights are considered so basic and fundamental as to be nonderogable,
and any violation is considered persecution.
Included are genocide, slavery, torture, and
arbitrary arrest and detention.
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belief or characteristic associated with him.53
United States asylum law is further defined by case law. INS v.
Stevic5 4 established that the burden is on the alien to prove there is a "clear
probability" that one's life or freedom would be threatened upon return to
a given country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.55 The court in CardozaFonseca v. INS 6 held the threat of persecution may come from the
government or from groups the government is "unwilling or unable to
control. "5"
The "well-founded fear" of persecution was initially defined by In
re Acosta,5 8 and In re Mogharrabi.59 In order to establish a "well-founded
fear" of persecution, an alien must show he possesses a belief or
characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of
punishment of some sort; the persecutor is aware, or could become aware,
that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; the persecutor has the
capability of punishing the alien; and the persecutor has the inclination to
punish the alien.' The term was further defined in Blanco-Comarribasv.
INS,6 where the court held the fear of persecution must be both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. 62
Case law has also refined the definitions for each of the five
enumerated categories, but this Comment will focus primarily on the
categories of "particular social group" and "political opinion," which are
the primary categories used by women seeking asylum for gender-based
persecution. The Handbook defines political opinion broadly, stating that

53. In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1992).
54. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
55. Id.
56. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. Id.
58. In re Acosta, 19 1 & N Dec. at 211.
59. In re Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N Dec. 439, 441 (BIA 1987).
60. Id. at 446.
61. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987).
62. In re Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N Dec. at 445; the BIA held the objective standard is met if
a reasonable person in similar circumstances would fear persecution. A reasonable person may
fear persecution even if the likelihood that it may occur is significantly less than a clear
probability. Id. Moreover, an alien's own testimony, without corroborative evidence, may be
sufficient to establish a "well-founded fear" of persecution where testimony is believable,
consistent and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account for the basis of
fear. Id. In In re Chen, the court ruled asylum relief could be granted for humanitarian reasons,
even if there was little likelihood of future persecution. In re Chen, 21 1 & N Dec. 3104 (BIA
1989).
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a person can fear persecution because of a political opinion even if the
opinion is not expressed. Further, action or inaction can constitute an
expression of political opinion. 63 Following this premise, in INS v. EliasZacarias,64 the Supreme Court held a petitioner must actually possess
political opinions and the persecutor's motives must be based on those
Imputed opinions are not to be considered, but a court may
opinions.
interpret resistance or noncompliance as a manifestation of opposition.66
The Supreme Court's decision goes against the holding of Lazo-Majano v.
INS,67 where the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled a political opinion imputed
to the petitioner is a valid basis for relief.
There are even greater conflicts concerning the category of a
"particular social group." No United States court has yet defined the
qualifications necessary to establish membership in a particular social
group. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS68 was the first appellate case to consider
what constitutes a particular social group. The court stated a particular
social group is normally comprised of persons of similar backgrounds,
habits, or social status, habits which are essentially beyond the individuals
power to change.69
While courts have generally agreed that members must share some
common characteristic which is fundamental to their identity as a member
of a particular social group that is both recognizable and discrete and
serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor,70 there are
conflicting decisions concerning whether the characteristic must be
immutable. The BIA decision in In re Acosta7 ' established the social group
must share a "common immutable characteristic" or that "the common
characteristic that defines the group . . . must be one that the members of
the group either cannot change or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their identities or consciences." 72 This

63. Stevens, supra note 15, at 203 (citing Craig A. Fielden, Note, Persecution on Account
of Political Opinion: Refugee Status After INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 67 WASH. L. REV. 959, 977
(1992)).
64. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
65. Id. at 482.
66. Id.
67. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); see Gomez v. INS, 947
F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
71. In re Acosta, 19 1 & N Dec. at 211.
72. Id.
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decision acknowledged sex as an immutable characteristic.73 However, in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS?4 the Ninth Circuit held the phrase particular
social group meant a collection of people who are affiliated with each
other and have a common impulse or interest, and stated the existence of
the associational relationship must be voluntary.75 To date, this conflict
has not been resolved.76
The different court interpretations of political opinion and
membership in a particular social group have not borne well for women.
There have been few federal court cases addressing women's claims of
asylum based on membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, but in each case, relief was denied. In Gomez v. INS,77 the
petitioner Carmen Gomez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought
asylum alleging she had been raped by guerrilla forces at least five times
between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and that each time, her life had
been threatened and her home vandalized. She based her asylum claim on
membership in a "particular social group of women who had been raped
by the guerrillas" and claimed because of past persecution she had
established a well-founded fear of persecution should she return to El
Salvador.78 The court denied her request for relief, stating she had failed
to demonstrate the guerrillas were inclined, or would seek, to harm her
based on her membership in a "particular social group. ,79 The court held
the possession of such broadly based characteristics as youth or gender
does not create a particular social group, and such characteristics by
themselves do not distinguish members in the eyes of the persecutor. 80
Had the court recognized women fleeing gender-based persecution as
members of a particular social group, it is likely that Ms. Gomez would
have been granted asylum.
In Fatin v. INS,8' the petitioner Parastoo Fatin applied for asylum
under both the political opinion and particular social group categories, and
was denied relief under each. Fatin, an Iranian citizen, entered the United

73. Id.
74.

Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.

75.

Id.

76. BIA decisions are followed by immigration judges except in areas where the circuit
court has ruled otherwise.
77.

Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).

78.

Id. at 662.

79. Id. at 664.
80. Id.

81. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
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States in 1978 as a nonimmigrant student.12 In 1988 she applied for
asylum, claiming she was a member of a "particular social group of
educated, Western free-thinking individuals with a deeply rooted belief in
feminism" and she would be persecuted if she did not wear the traditional
Islamic veil. 3 Fatin also requested asylum based on her political opinion,
stating in high school she had participated in a political organization which
supported the Shah.'
The court dismissed her request based on political opinion,
reasoning because of the length of time since she participated in political
activities, she would not be singled out for persecution based on past
action.'
While acknowledging Fatin had established a legitimate social
group for asylum purposes, 6 the court denied her request for relief, stating
she failed to establish she would not wear a veil, making her subject to
persecution.8 7 The court went on to say that just because a state has laws
or traditions repugnant to the United States and our concepts of freedom, it
does not subject them to persecution. 8 "If persecution were defined that
expansively, a significant percentage of the world's population would
qualify for asylum in this country." 89
The reasoning and holding of Fatin were followed by the court in
Safie v. INS.'
In Safie, the petitioner, an Iranian women, requested
asylum as a member of a "particular social group of Iranian women who
advocate women's rights or oppose Iranian customs relating to dress and
behavior," as well as for her political opinion as a Shah supporter. Safie's
claim based on membership in a particular social group was denied
because the court found her opposition was not of the "depth and intensity

82. Id. at 1235-37.
83. Id. The veil is known as the chador, and the Islamic practice requiring the veiling of
women is known as the Hejab. See Neal, supra note 24, for a detailed discussion of Islamic
traditions pertaining to women.
84. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
85. Id. Courts have since held that an alien need not prove that they would be "singled
out" for persecution in order to establish a valid asylum claim.
86. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. The social group was Iranian women who refuse to conform
to the government's gender-specific laws and social norms.
87. Id. Fatin stated that she would try not to wear the veil, not that she would not wear
one. Nor did she testify that wearing the veil was so abhorrent to her deepest beliefs that it
would amount to persecution.
88. Id. at 1240.
89. Id.
90. Safie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
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required." 9' Her political opinion claim was denied because she failed 92to
establish she had or would be singled out and persecuted for her opinion.

In each of these cases the court correctly held that persecution was
not based on the petitioner's political opinion. Each petitioner was
persecuted specifically because of their gender, and had the courts

acknowledged women fleeing gender-based persecution as members of a
particular social group it is likely each would have been granted asylum.93
The United States needs to start implementing substantive

immigration laws recognizing the unique circumstances of some women
seeking asylum in order to alleviate the discrepancies among the courts and
to end the discrimination against women.

Such action would be in line

with the recommendations of the United Nations and the changes being
implemented in Europe and Canada.
IV.

UNITED NATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHANGES IN CANADA
AND GERMANY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN RECOGNITION OF THE
PARTICULAR NEEDS OF WOMEN SEEKING ASYLUM

Since 1980, the United Nations has focused on the particular needs
of women seeking asylum.
Following its lead, Canada and many
European countries have implemented changes to their respective asylum
laws, addressing the special circumstances encompassed in women's
asylum claims.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) is the most prominent international document
to recognize the right of women to be free from discrimination. 9" Ratified
by 112 countries, although not the United States,95 it specifically
acknowledges all forms of discrimination against women. %

The CEDAW

91. Id. While Safie claimed to have been arrested for smoking and wearing Western
clothes and make-up, the court found she did not show proof she had suffered severe
consequences because of her nonconformance. Id. at 640. The amount of prior persecution
needed to establish a valid asylum claim is determined on a case by case basis, because asylum is
considered a personal issue.
92. Id.; see Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d. Cir. 1991).
93. See also Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (rape by terrorists
based on uncle's political opinion does not constitute persecution on account of political opinion
or membership in a particular social group); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986)
(repeated sexual assault by a member of the Salvadoran army not based on imputed political
opinion or membership in a particular social group).
94. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 197 n.9 (citing to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc. AJRES/34/46 (1980)) [hereinafter CEDAIW].
95. Id. at 197 n. 13.
96. Id. at 197 n. 12.
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prohibits discriminatory state action and demands that governments take
action to end both state and private discriminatory practices on any level
and in any form against women.97 It also considers gender-based violence
a form of discrimination, and considers such action a violation of the
Convention. 98
In 1985 the International Seminar on Refugee Women was held. 99
Its purpose was to examine the situation of refugee women worldwide, and
concluded states should acknowledge gender-based persecution and grant
asylum to women who have suffered forms of oppression which violate
human rights."0
Later that year, the UNHCR issued its "Conclusions on Refugee
Women," declaring that countries might recognize claims of gender-based
persecution under the "particular social group" category for purposes of
asylum claims.' ' It urged states to recognize the social, economic and
cultural oppression of women, and that they should interpret asylum laws
liberally when granting asylum to women faced with such persecution."
It stressed the special needs of women refugees concerning health,
education, and employment, and urged states to consider women seeking
asylum for having transgressed social mores in their country as members
of a "particular social group."1°3
97. Id. at 197 n.13.
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term discrimination against women
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction, made on the basis of sex which has
the effect of, or purpose of, impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Id. (citing CEDAWpt.1, art.1).
98. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 198 n.15.
This definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence. That is violence
which is directed against women because she is a woman or which affects women
disproportionately. It includes acts which inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Genderbased violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether
those provisions mention violence.
Id. (citing to CEDAWpt.1, art. 1).
99. Neal, supra note 24, at 230.
100. Id. (citing Recommendations, in INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON REFUGEE WOMEN 53

n. 148 (Soesterberg, The Netherlands, May 22-24, 1985)).
101. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3, (citing United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees
Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection Report of the 36th Sess., at
38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/673 (1985)).
102. Neal, supra note 24, at 231 n.151.
103. Id. at 231 nn.153 & 154.
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Another document addressing gender-based violence was the 1985
Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women
which was initiated by the World Conference to Review and Appraise the
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. °4 It urged states
to address the end of violence against women by providing assistance to its
victims, increasing public awareness of the problem, and establishing
policies and procedures to prevent the continuance of such abuse. 05
In 1991 the UNHCR issued guidelines which specifically recognize
the unique circumstances of some women seeking asylum.' °6 These
guidelines call for states to recognize women who fear severe
discrimination or gender-based persecution as members of a particular
social group for asylum determination.' 7 The 1991 UNHCR Guidelines
also state a subgroup of women can be recognized based on their exposure
or vulnerability to violence, including domestic violence, when their
governments deny them protection from such persecution, particularly
when their vulnerability is a result of their gender.'° 8
In 1993 the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women condemned acts of gender-based violence as a
per se violation of human rights.'°0 Such violence includes physical,
sexual, or psychological harm occurring in public or private life,
specifically domestic battering and female genital mutilation.110
Following the lead of the United Nations, Germany was one of the
first countries to recognize women as a particular social group for asylum
purposes. Several Iranian nationals applied for asylum in the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1986, one claiming that as a woman she was

104. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 198 n.18 (referring to Report of the World
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decadefor Women:
Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 116/28/Rev. 1 at 6 (1986)). The Decade

for Women ran from January 1976 through December 1986, and urged the equality of men and
women. Id.
105. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 199 n.207.
106. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3 (citing UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF
REFUGEE WOMEN (Geneva, July 1991)).

107. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596 n. 176.
108. Id. at 596 n.178. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 1993,
U.N. Dept. of Public Information DPI/1394-39399-Aug. 1993-20M, which emerged as a result of
the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, also recognizes violence against women
as a violation of human rights. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 5.
109. In re M.K., A-72-374-558 (citing to Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104 (1993)).
110.

Id.
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subject to special persecution." l ' While all of the applicants were granted
asylum on the basis of their political activities, the German Federal Office
held the woman was a member of a social group of Iranian women subject
to persecution "specific to women."" 2 The Office stated that "the
ideology based power of men over women results in a general political
repression of women in defiance of their individual liberties and human
rights. "I"
Continuing its trend, in 1992 the German Federal Office granted
asylum to a Romanian woman who had been abducted and sexually abused
by a town mayor." 4 The Office found persecution is political when
associated with an immutable characteristic, and since gender is an
immutable characteristic, any gender-based persecution is "political
persecution."'"5
Canada has also changed its guidelines, acknowledging the
increasing international support for the application of the particular social
group category to women claiming asylum based on fear of persecution
because of their gender." 6 The Canadian guidelines, released by the
Immigration and Refugee Board in March 1992,"' and enacted into law in
1993, state that women who are unable to obtain government protection
from spousal abuse, who are subject to violence by public officials, or who
fear persecution for violating discriminatory laws, traditions or customs,
will be given special consideration for refugee status.'
These violations
can include choosing a spouse rather than accepting an arranged marriage,
wearing make-up, or wearing the clothing of her choice." 9 The guidelines
also recognize the unique persecution of women in the form of infanticide,
bride burning, compulsory sterilization, and genital mutilation." 2

111.

Bower, supra note 11, at 200 (referring to Seven Case Abstracts (IJRL/0222), 1 INT'L

J. REFUGEE L. 566(1989)).

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Bower, supra note 11, at 201 (citing Ref. No. AN17K91.44245 Feb. 19, 1992,
UNHCR REFCAS database).
115. Id.
116. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596.
117. Stevens, supra note 15, at 197.
118. Kristine M. Fox, Gender Persecution: Canadian Guidelines Offer a Model for
Refugee Determination in the United States, 11 ARIZ. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 118 n.20 (1994)
(citing Alan Thompson, Canada First in Recognizing Abused Women as Refugees, TORONTO
STAR, Mar. 10, 1993, at A2).
119. Kelly, supra note 1, at 662.
120. Stevens, supra note 15, at 197.
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Unlike the United States,' 2' Canada does not require that the social
group be "internally cohesive" and states the size of the particular social
group is irrelevant, 2 2 The Canadian guidelines state that the only relevant
consideration is whether the group "suffers or fears to suffer severe
discrimination or harsh and inhuman treatment that is distinguished from
the situation of the general population, or from other women."23
Canadian case law has dealt with several asylum claims of women
seeking refuge from gender-based persecution and, unlike the United
States, has granted these women asylum based on their membership in a
particular social group. In August 1987, the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board held that a woman living alone in a Muslim country which
requires females to live under the protection of a male family member was
subject to persecution and constituted a particular social group. 24
In Mayers v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal reviewed the decision of an
administrative panel which found a Trinidadian woman could be
considered a refugee."25 While the court did not determine if the particular
woman qualified for asylum, it held Trinidadian women subject to spousal
abuse may constitute a particular social group when the government fails
to intercede on their behalf, and that such abuse may constitute
persecution. 2 6
Also in 1992, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board
granted asylum to a woman from Zimbabwe who had been forced to marry
at age fifteen, and had suffered continual abuse, including rape, at the
hands of her husband. 27 The court found that the applicant had proven
"good grounds for fear of persecution" based on her membership in a
"particular social group of Zimbabwean women and girls, forced to marry
according to the customary laws of Kurzvarira and Lobola. "28
Canada has also granted asylum to women facing forced

121. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
122. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596.
123.

Id.

124. Kelly, supra note 19, at 528 (citing to Incirciyan v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, Immigration Appeal Board Decision M87-1541X (Aug. 10 1987)).
125. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 208 n.72 (referring to Ministry of Employment
and Immigration v. Marcel Mayers, Federal Court of Appeals, #A544-92, Toronto (Nov. 8,
1992)).
126.

Id.

127. Id. (citing Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision
U92-06668, heard Nov. 13, 1992 (Can.)).
128.

Kelly, supra note 19, at 670.
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sterilization in China. In Chung v. M.E.L ,129 the court held that women
who bear more than one child and face forced sterilization are members of
a particular social group. 3 ' The court stated these women are a group of

people who share different views from their government, have a similar
basic characteristic in common, and are identified by the common purpose
of reproduction so fundamental to their human dignity, that they should not
be required to forsake it."'

While there are recognizable problems when addressing genderbased persecution claims, 32 particularly intimate abuse, these problems
can be overcome, as demonstrated by Germany and Canada. Further,
while concern for the respect warranted by other societies' traditions and

cultures should definitely be a consideration, there are some situations
33
when respect for human life and dignity outweigh diplomatic protocol.

The main fear in the United States is expanding the definition of the
particular social group to include women seeking asylum from gender-

based persecution would open the flood-gates for asylum claims. 134 This
fear is unfounded. 35 Even if a woman can establish membership in a
129. Mawani, supra note 12, at 246 (citing Cheung v. M.E.I., No. A-785-91, Linden,
Mahony, Stone (Apr. 1, 1993)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Many women are afraid to testify about intimate sexual abuse. Further, such abuse is
often difficult to prove.
133. In In re Oluloro, the court found that after reviewing the evidence regarding female
genital mutilation, although it attempted to respect the traditions and cultures of other societies, it
considered the practice cruel and serving no known medical purpose. No. A72-147-491, (U.S.
Immigr. Ct. Seattle, Wash. Mar. 23, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision). "While it could possibly
have had some purpose in ancient cultures, whatever the utility the practice might have ever had,
it no longer exists." Id.
134. Asylum advocates, as well as its detractors, have raised concerns about expanding the
definition of refugee to recognized gender-based persecution. See Deborah Sontag, Women
Asking U.S. Asylum Expand Definition of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at C8. This fear
is based on a belief that the number of asylum applicants will increase, adding to the current
antiimmigrant movement and creating hardships for the refugees and immigrants currently
residing in the United States, as well as leading to new restrictions in immigration policies. Id.;
see also Kelly, supra note 19, at 627. Federal Courts have also indicated a fear of expanding the
definition of particular social group. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, concerning Salvadoran males
fleeing to avoid persecution for failing to join the military, the court stated "this class of young
working class urban males may be so broad and encompass so many variables that to recognize
any person who might conceivably establish that he was a member of this class and is entitled to
asylum . . . would render the meaning of refugee meaningless." 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (1986).
135. "Despite the propaganda about America being overwhelmed with immigrants, the rate
of immigration is about one-third what it was at the beginning of the century. . . . [Wlithout
immigration, America would not long have existed. Now, without immigration it cannot exist as
a world power." A.M. Rosenthal, Are We 'America the Mingy?' Halting Immigration is Blind
Folly, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 1995, at I1A.
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particular social group she must still demonstrate state involvement in the
persecution, through action or inaction. She must also meet both the
subjective and objective prongs of a well-founded fear of persecution, as
well as establishing the only form of relief available to her is asylum. As
demonstrated in Canada and Germany, expanding the definition of a
particular social group to include women fleeing gender-based persecution
has not opened the flood-gates.
V.

Two GROUND-BREAKING CASES

A. In re A and Z
In a potentially ground-breaking case, a United States immigration
judge granted asylum to a Jordanian woman fleeing intimate abuse, finding
her eligible for asylum under both the political opinion and particular
social group categories, noting that the two categories may be
interchangeable. 36
The petitioner was a woman who fled Jordan in 1990 with her
child, requesting asylum on the basis of spousal abuse. She presented
evidence establishing ongoing abuse at the hands of her husband over a
thirty year period of time. Testifying and presenting corroborating
witnesses and documents, the petitioner proved that her husband had
beaten her in front of others, even during pregnancy. One incident
occurred when she attempted to obtain her high school diploma. Also, on
several occasions he placed her under house arrest, refusing to let her step
out of the house. She was also not permitted to work, or to have friends,
or her own bank account. Her husband would not even give her gas
money. Further, it was established that the petitioner's husband beat her
just to "keep her in line."
In May 1990, the petitioner's husband threatened her with a gun,
firing it into a room where she and her child were located. It was then that
she decided to leave. Under Jordanian policy, however, the petitioner
could not travel without the consent of her husband. He refused to consent
and obtained a detainment court order to prevent her from leaving. Her
husband finally permitted her to come to the United States, where they
owned a home, during the summer of 1990. The petitioner's husband
followed her to the United States where the abuse continued. When he
finally realized that the petitioner would not return to Jordan with him, he
stopped giving the petitioner and her child financial support.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service argued the case

136. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington,
Va. Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision).
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concerned personal marital abuse, but the court disagreed. 3 7 The
petitioner presented evidence establishing not only that she could not
receive protection from the Jordanian government, but that such abuse was
traditionally accepted38 and it is a cultural norm not to seek police assistance
for domestic abuse. 1
The court found that the petitioner was a member of a particular
social "group of women who are challenging the traditions of the
Jordanian government and society. "139 It found that by fleeing her
husband, thus challenging her husband's power to abuse her, she also
challenged the system of submission of women in Jordan by espousing her
feminist beliefs.'" Citing Fatin v. INS,' 4 1 the court also held that feminism
qualifies as a political opinion. 42
The court found the abuse suffered by the petitioner demonstrated
that she was willing to suffer the consequences for asserting her beliefs.' 43
Furthermore, she showed she was unwilling to accept any further abuse
because her Western feminist beliefs collided with traditional Jordanian
values.'44 The court concluded that the petitioner's social group is basic to
her political opinion and they are interchangeable. 4 5 Based on the
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practicesfor
1992, it found that there are few legal avenues for redress of intimate
abuse in Jordan, and the actions of the petitioner's husband are
traditionally accepted." 6 As such, the court concluded that although the
persecution was done on a private level, the government was a
collaborator by its inaction in preventing it."47 Based on the husband's past
actions and the government's inaction, the court found a clear probability
4
the petitioner would be subject to persecution if she returned to Jordan.' 1
In granting her request for relief from deportation, the court stated the
petitioner was eligible for asylum under both the political opinion and

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29,
Id. at 30.
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993).
In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219, at 30.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219, at 30.

148. Id.
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particular social group categories.149

B. In re M.K.
In a more recent decision out of the same immigration court, a
twenty-nine year old woman from Sierra Leone was granted asylum on
three bases: persecution relating to her resistance to, but forcibly
imposed, genital mutilation; persecution through spousal abuse as a result
of her attempts to assert her feminine views; and persecution because of
her political opinion. 150

The court noted that although it considered the issue of female
genital mutilation a case of first impression concerning a claim for asylum,

the same issue was addressed in the context of a suspension of deportation
hearing by an immigration judge sitting in Seattle, Washington.' 5

The respondent, M. K., entered the United States in August 1991
on a visitor's visa. She applied for asylum when the INS instituted
deportation proceedings against her for remaining in the United States
52
without authorization and she was found to be deportable.

M.K. is twenty-nine, married, and a native and citizen of Sierra
Leone. She has a high school level education and is trained and employed
as a nursing assistant. At the age of fifteen the respondent's mother began
pressing her to submit to female gentile mutilation.'5 3 She continuously
refused, at the risk of becoming an outcast, treated as a nonadult, or
shunned, 5 4 because three of her friends had died as a result of the practice
and numerous others suffered pain because of the mutilation. At the age
149. Id. at 29.
150. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558. The court's rationale concerning the third category of
political opinion will not be discussed in this article.
151. Id. at 2 (referring to Oluloro and a suspension of deportation proceeding under
Immigration & Nationality Act §244). In order to qualify for suspension of deportation, an
applicant must have been present in the United States for seven years immediately preceding the
application, be a person of good moral character, and that deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the alien, her United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or
child. Immigration & Nationality Act §244(a)(1). The burden of proof is on the alien to
establish eligibility for suspension of deportation. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960). In
Oluloro, the court granted the suspension on the basis of potential hardship to the respondent's
two minor female children who would be subject to female genital mutilation if the respondent
was deported to Nigeria. Oluloro No. A72-147-491 at 17.
152. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 at 2.
153. Female genital mutilation is a traditional practice in Sierra Leone (with the exception
of the Creoles, who make up 20% of the population) and approximately 80% of the female
population of that country undergo some form of this mutilation. Id. at 5.
154. According to the testimony of Susan Rich, an expert on African family planning, in
Bundo Society a social stigma attaches to the woman who refuses to undergo the mutilation. Id.
at 7.
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of twenty-one the respondent ran away from home when her mother told
her she would be forced to undergo the procedure, returning only when
her mother promised her she would not be forced.
However, in January 1989, after the birth of her child, the
respondent was abducted from her parents home, blind folded and bound,
and taken against her will to a place in the jungle called the "Bundo Bash."
There her "initiation" into the Bundo Society was performed.115 She was
stripped of her clothes and bound while an elder woman, using an
unsterilized razor, cut away her clitoris and labia minor. She was not
given anything to ease the pain. Six women sang to disguise the screams
of the respondent and six other victims.
As a result of the "operation" the respondent bled for five hours
and lost consciousness, but the group refused to take her to the hospital for
fear the Bundo secret would be revealed.' A woman doctor was called in
to stop the bleeding. Following the mutilation the respondent received two
weeks of instruction on a woman's role in society and was forced by threat
of death to take an oath of silence concerning the ritual and her mutilation.
The court accepted testimony that there is no legal recourse
regarding female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone, reasoning it is a
traditional practice and police would inform the Bundo Society should
anyone reveal the "secret" by lodging a complaint. 157 As a result, the
court concluded the government was either unable or unwilling to stop the
persecution, finding genital mutilation mandated for all non-Creole women
in Sierra Leone. 5
Recognizing forced female genital mutilation as a form of
persecution, 159 the court held the respondent warranted asylum on the basis
of either "persecution on account of political opinion" for her resistance
to, and complaints about, female genital mutilation; or "persecution on
155. Expert testimony at the respondent's hearing established that "initiation" into the
Bundo Society, of which the respondent's family were members and which all women are
required to join, is to inculcate young women on their socially-imposed roles. In re M.K., No.
A72-374-558 at 6. Female genital mutilation is part of the initiation and is performed by a
Digba, a women elder, using a razor blade or broken glass to perform the surgery. Id. While
the Digba is permitted to drink intoxicants, the victims are given nothing to relieve the pain. In
re M.K., No. A72-374-558 at 6 (referring to the testimony of Susan Rich and Dr. Gary S.
Eglinton, an Associate professor and Director of Maternal-Fetal Medicine in the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at Georgetown University School of Medicine).
156. The respondent's long term health has also been affected. Id. She suffers from
discomfort, a chronic rash, and has endured a miscarriage as a result of an infection caused by
the mutilation. Id.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 13.
159. In re M.K., No. A-72-374-558 at 19.
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account of membership in the social group that consists of women who are
forced to undergo female genital mutilation."" ° The court also granted
asylum based on the respondent's "past attempts to assert her individual
autonomy, resulting in physical spousal abuse, and because of her fear of
future harm, given the threat of her husband to kill her." 6 '
The respondent married her husband in 1985. Since 1988 he
abused her both verbally and physically, beating her with his fists and feet
approximately every two months because she was mouthy. 6 2 On three
occasions respondent complained to the police about the abuse and on each
occasion was told the police could do nothing because it was a domestic
matter.' 63 The respondent's husband beat her, even during her two
pregnancies, so she refused to bear him any more children, further
angering him. The beatings continued until 1990 when the respondent left
him.'" At the time of the hearing the respondent was in the process of
divorcing her husband. As a result, he has threatened to kill her because
she refuses to bear him more children, refuses to relinquish custody of
their two children, and is carrying out her threat to divorce him.'1
On the basis of this testimony, the court also granted the
respondent asylum because of spousal abuse stating that such abuse could
be "classified as either: 'persecution on account of political opinion' for
her resistance to mandated female subservience and complaints about
physical spousal abuse; or 'persecution on account of membership in the
social group that consists of women who have been punished with physical
spousal abuse for attempting to assert their individual autonomy.'""
These cases are significant for two reasons. In re A and Z is
believed to be the first decision by an immigration judge in which a
woman was granted asylum based on intimate abuse because such abuse
was found to constitute persecution. In re M.K. is the first case to hold
female genital mutilation is a form of persecution meriting asylum.
Second, both cases identify women who have faced and are facing gender160. Id. at 14. "Inaddition, Respondent is eligible for asylum on humanitarian grounds
because of the horror of being forced to undergo female genital mutilation." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 9.
163. Testimony by Susan Rich confirmed that in Sierra Leone men are considered head of
the house and a wife's disrespect or disobedience justifies her punishment. In re M.K., No. A72374-558, at 9. The court noted, referring to the report, State Department Sierra Leone Human
Rights Practices 1994, that wife-beating is common and rarely results in court action because it is
not recognized as a societal problem. d. at 10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 15.
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based persecution as members of a particular social group. These cases
should be upheld. Furthermore, they should be followed and expanded
upon.
The particular social group category was added as a ground for
refugee status in recognition of the potential failure of the other categories
to include all forms of persecution. 6 7 Both the definition of refugee and
the inclusion of the category for a particular social group indicate that it
was meant to cover groups, such as women who face gender-based
persecution, that are not covered by the other categories. Furthermore,
the United States was a contracting party to the Protocol, 68 and as a
member should follow the UNHCR guidelines which call on states to
recognize women fleeing
gender-based persecution as members of a
69
particular social group.
While the petitioners in both the In re A and Z and In re M.K.
were able to establish persecution because of their political opinion as well
as because they were members of a particular social group, other women
are targeted for persecution specifically because of their gender. The
United States needs to establish immigration policies recognizing that fact.
The flood-gates will not open. Canada and Germany are proof that fear
will not be realized.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an age where women's rights and equality are both recognized
and demanded, the United States should amend its immigration policies to
reflect the changes occurring world-wide. In a country that prides itself on
equality, the discrimination against refugee women should be
acknowledged and eliminated. The United States immigration laws and
policies were not carved in stone, but the words of Emma Lazarus were.
Those are the words that should be followed-and those words were meant
to include women.

167. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (1982).
168. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558.
169. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).

